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Terrorism and the Laws of War
Eric A. Posner*
Do the laws of war apply to the US-led "war on terror"? There are several
positions. (1) The laws of war do apply and to the same extent that they apply in
regular wars. (2) The laws of war do not apply; the US military has a free hand.
(3) The laws of war apply but in modified form.'
This disagreement matters because the laws of war, if they do apply, could
interfere with current US policy. If position (1) is correct, and a captured al
Qaeda suspect is considered a prisoner of war ("POW"), he has the right to
receive humane treatment, to have contact with humanitarian organizations, and
to have various procedural protections in case he is tried for war crimes.2 At the

end of the "war," he must be repatriated. All or many of these consequences
conflict with current US policy.3
Some people take position (2). They argue that because the "war on terror"
is a special kind of war, the ordinary laws of war-which were designed for
regular interstate wars, not wars against terrorist organizations-have no or
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1991, Harvard University. Thanks to Bill Martin for research assistance and the Russell Baker
Scholars Fund for financial support.
There is a fourth position: The laws of war do not apply because the "war on terror" is an
ordinary criminal enforcement action; instead, the relevant constitutional and criminal laws apply
(both foreign and domestic). For a discussion, see generally Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to
Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale J Intl L 559 (1999) (written before Sept 11, 2001);
Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 Harv J L & Pub Poly 457 (2001-02); Ronald J.
Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 Notre Dame L Rev 307 (200203); Peter Spiro, Not War, Crimes (FindLaw Sept 19, 2001), available online at
<http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20010919-spiro.htnil> (visited Oct 17, 2004).
For skepticism about whether denying POW status makes much of a difference, see Derek Jinks,
The DecliningSignificance of POW Status, 45 Harv Ind L J 367 (2004).
The US government has tried to evade these consequences by classifying members of al Qaeda as
"unlawful combatants." For a general discussion of the international lawfulness of such a
classification, see Symposium, Agora: Military Commissions, 96 Am J Intl L 320 (2002).
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limited relevance.4 On this view, US authorities can treat al Qaeda suspects
however they want, subject only to the minimal constraints in general human
rights treaties.
I will argue for a position somewhere between (2) and (3). The laws of war
might sensibly be applied to conflicts between states and international terrorist
organizations, though most likely in a highly modified form. Currently, there is
no reason to think they should be applied to the conflict with al Qaeda, but this
may change with time.
My argument has three steps. First, I discuss the purposes of the laws of
war, and argue that humanitarian considerations provide only an ambiguous
rationale for limiting the weapons and tactics of warfare. Second, I discuss why
some weapons and tactics are outlawed while others are not, and argue that
humanitarian ideals cannot, by themselves, explain the pattern. The best
explanation focuses on the enforceability of laws. I identify two conditions
under which belligerents would agree on a law of war, and would be willing to
comply with their agreement. The symmetry condition requires that the laws of
war generate military advantages for neither belligerent. The reciprocity
condition requires that each belligerent have the ability to retaliate when the
other belligerent violates the laws of war. Third, I discuss the extent to which
these conditions apply to the war on terror. I argue that at present they do not
apply at all, but they have applied in other conflicts between governments and
international terrorist organizations and could apply to the conflict between the
US and al Qaeda in the future.
At the outset, I should make clear that my focus is on the law, and not
other considerations that might influence tactics used against enemy states or
terrorist organizations. My question is whether the laws of war provide nations
with a reason for curtailing strategies and tactics. I do not address the question
whether independent moral or pragmatic reasons exist for behaving in ways that
are not controlled by international law. For example, one might think that the
US has good moral or pragmatic reasons for treating captured al Qaeda
members humanely even if one concludes that it is not constrained to do so by
the laws of war.
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE LAWS OF WAR

Laws of war have existed since ancient times. The Greeks recognized a rule
prohibiting armies from pursuing defeated enemy armies. Soldiers in the Middle
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Compare Kenneth Anderson, Who Owns the Rules of War?, NY Times Mag 38 (Apr 13, 2003)
(arguing that the laws of war need to be rethought in light of the increasing "asymmetry" of
armed conflict).

Vol. 5 No. 2

Terrorism and the Laws of War

Posner

Ages granted quarter to enemy soldiers who threw down their weapons. Laws of
war were, until recently, not formally codified in treaties or conventions, but had
evolved as custom. By the end of the nineteenth century, the major states agreed
that the laws of war that were then recognized ought to be more clearly specified
in treaty instruments. Conventions were called in The Hague, and then in
Geneva; these conventions yielded, at intervals, instruments that together record
the modern laws of war.5
The laws of war, as they are currently understood, can be divided into
general principles and specific rules. The principles hold that soldiers may target
only enemy soldiers and other military objectives, and not civilians or civilian
property; that incidental damage to civilians and their property should not be
disproportionate to the value of the military target; and that weapons and tactics
used even against military targets should not cause unnecessary suffering.
These principles are reflected in various specific rules. An early rule against
the use of dumdum bullets seems to have been based on the premise that their
military justification-stopping a soldier-could be accomplished with an
6
ordinary bullet, and the dumdum bullet caused unnecessary bodily damage. A
similar idea underlies rules against the use of poison gas, blinding laser weapons,
and explosives that produce microscopic projectiles that cannot be detected by
doctors. Recent efforts to outlaw land mines rest on the argument that these
weapons' harm to civilians outweighs their military value. Rules against the
destruction of military hospitals and execution and mistreatment of POWs
be limited to what is necessary for
reflect the principle that suffering should
7
objectives.
military
legitimate
achieving
The traditional statement in favor of laws of war is that they serve
humanitarian principles.8 Wars are brutal and awful; it would be better to
minimize the suffering by requiring soldiers to follow a minimal set of rules. It is
better for soldiers to take prisoners than to execute enemies who surrender; it is
better to treat POWs well than to starve and torture them; it is better to spare
civilians than to kill them. 9
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On the history, see generally Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Clarendon 1994); Geoffrey
Best, Humanity in Warfare (Columbia 1980); Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark
R. Shulman, eds, The Laws of War- Constraintson Warfare in the Western World (Yale 1994).
See Eric A. Posner, A Theogy of the Laws of War, 70 U Chi L Rev 297, 298 (2003).
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See Christopher Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New Millennium, in Michael N.
Schmitt and Leslie C. Green, eds, The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millennium 185, 189-90
(Naval War College 1998).
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As attractive as these ideas are, they are vulnerable to diverse criticisms.
One problem is that war itself is brutal and horrible, and if laws of war are
enforceable, why limit them to the scope of the principles described above? Why
not outlaw war altogether, or limit it to a duel between chosen representatives of
each side, as was tried (unsuccessfully) by the Greeks and the Trojans in The
Iliad? And if this is unrealistic, then why think that the existing laws of war can
exert any force in the first place? The implicit assumption of the laws of war is
that the evils of war can be lessened but cannot be eliminated. However, the idea
of humanitarianism is too vague to provide an explanation for the lines that are
drawn.
A second problem with the humanitarian theory is that the laws of war
apply equally to both (or all) sides of the dispute, and thus indifferently to the
aggressor and its victim. In theory, the French should have complied with the
laws of war to the same extent as the Nazi invaders, but if aggression was
initiated by the Nazis, why shouldn't the prospect of foreign occupation and
Nazi tyranny justify the use of all means necessary to resist the invasion,
including the mass killing of German civilians? Indeed, by the end of the war,
the British and the Americans had concluded that mass killing of enemy civilians
was justified for ending the Nazi menace, even if it was formally a violation of
the laws of war. 10 This problem was recognized as early as Grotius, who
appeared to believe that the belligerent with the just cause was not constrained
by the principle of proportionality.1
Third, a more humane war may be one that is more likely to occur and
more likely to persist once it begins. One argument in favor of area bombing
during World War II was that it would demoralize German citizens and end the
war earlier. Thus, the short-term costs would be high, but in the long term fewer
soldiers and citizens would die than if targeted bombing was used. This was also
the justification for dropping atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And
during the cold war, reliance on nuclear weapons was justified for their deterrent
value: no war would occur just because the weapons were so inhumane.
10

The issue arose again during the Kosovo intervention when human rights groups complained that
NATO's use of high altitude bombing protected pilots at unreasonable expense to civilians who
were killed or injured by errant bombs. See, for example, Amnesty International, "Collateral
Damage" or Unlawful Killings?. Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force 1820
(June
2000),
available
online
at
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
EUR700182000ENGLISH/$File/EUR7001800.pdf>
(visited Oct 17, 2004). The relevant
question is, if you think that the Kosovo intervention was justified on humanitarian or security
grounds, but think that American public opinion would not have tolerated an air campaign that
resulted in nontrivial casualties to American pilots, should the American government have chosen
not to intervene in order to avoid violating international humanitarian law?

11

See Judith Gail Gardam, Proporlionaliy and Force in InternationalLaw, 87 Am J Ind L 391, 396 n 30
(1993).
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These considerations suggest that the humanitarian contribution of the
laws of war is ambiguous. The laws may make war more humane by depriving
soldiers of destructive weapons and tactics; but they may make war less humane
by prolonging it, and they may make the world less secure by making war more
attractive. How these tradeoffs should be evaluated is a difficult question that I
have addressed elsewhere and will not repeat here. 2 For the purpose of this
paper, I will assume that a proper evaluation of the tradeoff would not indicate
that laws of war are undesirable, and that some laws of war-moderate or
expansive-are optimal.
My focus from now on is enforceability. Many proposed laws of war,
though desirable in the abstract, are not created because states will not agree to
them or because they are not enforceable. Part II addresses this problem.

II. SYMMETRY AND RECIPROCITY
As noted earlier, the ideal of humanitarianism does not explain why some
weapons and tactics are outlawed and others are not. The ideal has no natural
stopping point: it suggests that all weapons and tactics should be outlawed,
which in turn implies that war itself should be outlawed. But the premise of the
laws in war-jus in bello-is that wars themselves are going to occur, whether or
not they are outlawed. So we have an empirical and normative puzzle. The
empirical puzzle is why some weapons and tactics are outlawed but not others,
even though they are all inconsistent with humanitarianism. The normative
puzzle is, why should humanitarianism stop short of abolition of war?
The answer to both puzzles is the same: states will agree to limits on
warfare and will comply with those limits only under certain conditions. This
Part discusses two of these conditions: symmetry and reciprocity.
Initially, we need to understand what exactly the laws of war accomplish
from the perspective of the states. Suppose that two states are at war, expect the
war to end some day, and prefer to minimize their own losses. Everything else
being equal, the ultimate winner would rather win at less expense of blood and
treasure than at greater expense; the ultimate loser would also rather lose at less
expense rather than at greater expense. Thus, even though the states are at war,
they share an interest in minimizing their losses. The problem for each state is
that it can minimize its own losses only by persuading the other state to use less,
rather than more, destructive weapons and tactics. But, given that the states are
at war, how can one state persuade the other to use less force?
The answer is that, in theory, the states can implicitly agree on joint limits
on the use of force as long as the limits make both states better off, each state
12
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can credibly threaten to retaliate against the other state for violating the limits,
and each state cares enough about the future. The strategic problem is similar to
the prisoner's dilemma, and the solution is the same: mutual threats of
retaliation. 3 But there must be limits to cooperation; why, otherwise, have the
war in the first place, or not end it early rather than merely limit the use of
weapons?
This brings us to what I will call .ymmetry and redprodty conditions. These
conditions are probably necessary for self-enforcing laws of war; I doubt they
are sufficient, however.
The ymmety condition says that a law of war can be self-enforcing, and
indeed possible in the first place, only if it gives an advantage to neither state in
the conflict. It must be neutral as between them.
Let me provide two examples. Prior to World War II, the great powers
discussed banning submarine warfare and certain kinds of sea mines. Britain
favored such a rule, but other states-such as France-opposed it.'4 The Great
Powers also discussed banning poison gas, did so, and (for the most part) did
not violate the rule.' 5 What accounts for this difference?
The best answer is that a ban on submarine warfare and sea mines would
have provided an advantage to one state; the ban on poison gas did not. Because
every major state had the capacity to manufacture and deploy poison gas, the
ban benefited all while not clearly providing an advantage to any state. Thus, a
ban was possible and turned out to be self-enforcing during World War II as
between the major belligerents. By contrast, although France and Britain both
would have benefited from a ban on submarine warfare because such a ban
would have protected their commercial shipping, Britain would have benefited
much more than France would have, and this would have given Britain an
advantage over France in a war (or, more likely, normal colonial competition).
Britain relied more on commercial shipping than France did, and Britain's naval
superiority would have been vulnerable to the new threats posed by submarines.
In the poison gas case, the gains were equal, giving no one a relative gain; in the
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The actual strategic setting is more complicated. There most likely will be asymmetric
information, for why would the states go to war unless there were some kind of bargaining
failure? The asymmetric information problem that results in war may explain why states are
unable, during the war, to make deals limiting the kinds of weapons and tactics they can use.
Agreeing to laws of war prior to the war makes such bargaining unnecessary, but then asymmetric
information may interfere with the threat of retaliation in case of violation of the laws, which then
makes cooperation difficult. I am assuming that the decision to go to war is a rational choice. See
generally James D. Fearon, RationalistExplanationsfor War,49 Ind Org 379 (1995).
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See Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II at 37
(Cornell 1995).
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submarine warfare case, the gains, while positive for both sides, would have
been unequal, giving Britain a relative gain vis-A-vis France, Germany, and other
countries.
These examples are relatively clear, but symmetry is always a matter of
context, and often the relative gains of a rule are hard to identify and vary
between different pairs of belligerents. Requiring humane treatment of POWs,
for example, may seem symmetrical, but in practice it may not be for various
reasons. For example:
1. Some states have, for internal reasons, a long history of treating
POWs well, so a new rule does not require any changes to practice or culture;
other states do not. The rule benefits the first group more than the second.
2. Some states turn out to have logistical advantages. If one state
captures POWs in its territory, for example, it may be easier to treat them
humanely than a state that captures them on hostile territory at the end of long
supply lines. The rule benefits the first state more than the second.
3. Some states might believe that treating POWs well is a good way to
get them to surrender, while other states might believe that treating POWs
poorly is a good way to demoralize the belligerent and persuade it to sue for
peace. The rule benefits the first state by not requiring it to act differently
from
6
the way it thinks is militarily appropriate; the rule hurts the second state.'
As a result, one finds a complex pattern in the treatment of POWs
reflecting all of these factors. I will say more about this in a moment.
Let's turn to the second condition for self-enforcing laws of war, which is
reeiprodcy. By this I mean that if a belligerent violates the laws of war, the
opponent both has the capacity and an interest in retaliating by violating the
same rule or some other rule. Reciprocity exists only when a war is ongoing, the
outcome is unclear, all belligerents share an interest in keeping the war limited,
and all belligerents have the ability to constrain those who fight under their flag.
Reciprocity requires that each state maintain an effective military authority
that can both ensure that its own soldiers obey the laws of war and that an
appropriate response-generally, retaliation-can be made when the other state
violates the laws of war. When a war is about to end, and the enemy is in
disarray, the other state has less reason to obey the laws of war because the
losing state is powerless to retaliate: thus, pillage and looting are more likely to
result than otherwise. And when one state violates all the laws of war-if it
adopts a scorched earth policy-then it loses the ability to retaliate against the
other state when that state violates the laws of war, as it cannot adopt more

16

For a discussion of these and related factors, see generally James D. Morrow, The Institutional
Features of the Prisonersof War Treaties, 55 Intl Org 971 (2001).
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extreme tactics than those that it already uses. In a limited war, both states
exercise self-restraint so that they have a way of retaliating if the other state fails
to exercise restraint.
Reciprocity helps to explain the single most ineffective area of the laws of
war: the laws of occupation. In no case since World War II has a state declared
that the laws of occupation are applicable to a particular occupation-the only
exception being America's current occupation of Iraq. 7 The reason is that a
conquered state has no power to retaliate against the conqueror for violating the
laws of war. There is no reciprocity.
Reciprocity is intuitive but frequently misunderstood. One often hears the
following complaint about a particular violation of the laws of war-say, the
American abuse of detained Iraqis during the recent war in Iraq: "Because the
US has violated the laws of war by torturing POWs and civilians, we can expect
that in its next war the US's enemy will torture American POWs." The logic
here is dubious. Suppose that the US's next war is with North Korea. There is
no reason to believe that North Korea will torture American POWs because US
forces tortured Iraqis. After all, if North Korea tortures American POWs, it can
expect the US to retaliate in some way. North Korea has no interest in
vindicating the rights of Iraqis; its interest is in limiting (or not) its war with the
US.
What is true is that if the US and North Korea are at war, the US may want
to treat North Korean POWs humanely in the hope that North Korea will
reciprocate and treat American POWs humanely. This is the true sense in which
reciprocity may function to the benefit of both sides.18
The symmetry condition and the reciprocity conditions overlap somewhat,
but they are intended to capture distinct phenomena. The symmetry condition
says that the law must give an advantage to no party. The reciprocity condition
says that one party must be able to retaliate if the other party violates the law. If
it cannot, this is usually because it has already been defeated (as in the case of
occupation) or it is not a well organized army (as in the case of civil wars
involving guerillas and irregulars, in some cases).

17
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See Eyal Benvenisti, The InternationalLawof Occupation 182 (Princeton 1993).
Note that there will often be divergence between the formal laws of war agreed to in advance of
war and the "law in action" as the war progresses. This happens because during wars weapons
and tactics evolve quickly and unpredictably, rendering earlier judgments irrelevant. For example,
during World War I, when the British imprisoned German U-boat crews for war crimes, the
Germans responded by imprisoning a group of British officers. Eventually, the British gave in:
they could not deter the Germans from their U-boat tactics because they valued humane
treatment of their captured soldiers more than any gains from imprisoning U-boat crews. See
Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 61-62 (Princeton
2000).
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III. THE WAR ON TERR6R
There are two polar responses to the problem of applying the laws of war
to international terrorism. One response is that the laws of war apply with full
force against terrorists. This view is reflected in the 1977 protocols to the
Geneva Convention, which many states, but not the United States, have ratified.
Under the 1977 protocols, nearly everyone picked up in a theater of combat is
entitled to protection of the laws of war.' 9 People guilty of war crimesincluding terrorists who blow up civilians-would, under these laws, be entitled
to various procedural protections. They could be punished for their crimes, but
not otherwise treated any differently from regular soldiers.
The opposite response is that no laws of war should apply to a state's
military operations against terrorists. This view is based on two
misunderstandings about terrorism. The first is that it is purely destructive and
has no political aim. Most terrorist groups have a specific political aim-in the
case of al Qaeda, the elimination of American military forces from Arab lands
and possibly the elimination of Western influence in the Middle East.20 This is a
coherent political aim, and it could be satisfied if the US adjusted its strategic
priorities. The second misunderstanding is that terrorists are not amenable to
reason and are unable to exercise self-discipline. Terrorist groups frequently
respect certain rules or enter modi vivendi with particular governments. 21 They
grant immunity to message-bearers, for example, and restrict their activities to
certain targets. Often terrorists seek to force governments into negotiations, and
they respect certain ground rules the violation of which would make negotiation
impossible. 22 In many cases-including in Spain, Italy, Northern Ireland, and
South Africa-terrorist organizations have evolved (albeit in some cases, only
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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art 48, 1125 UNTS 3, 25 (1977).
See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report 47 (2004), available online at <http://www.9-llcommission.gov/report/index.htm>
(visited Nov 15, 2004).
Religious terrorists may be undeterrable because they are motivated by religious duties. See Bruce
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 168 (Victor Gollancz 1998). They are also more violent. Id at 93. But
they have aims that they are pursuing using rational means, and this is true for terrorists generally.
Id at 183.
Hoffman provides some examples. Israel and the PLO exchange prisoners; other states and
terrorist organizations have done so as well. Id at 67, 133-35. Terrorist organizations sometimes
try to avoid harming civilians, focusing on soldiers and officials instead. Id at 164.
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partially) into political organizations that reached a settlement with the
government.23
It is true that terrorist groups do not act like most states, but states
themselves are highly diverse, and sometimes the governments of states and
terrorist organizations are hard to distinguish. Many such states do comply with
many rules of international law, even as they sponsor or engage in terrorism. If
ordinary states can be expected to comply with the laws of war while fighting
each other, then quasi-states, terrorist states, rogue states, and state-like terrorist
organizations may be expected to do so as well.
Laws of war are possible between states and terrorist organizations for the
same reason that they are possible in interstate disputes. Although each side has
an interest in defeating the other side, each side also has an interest in
minimizing its own losses prior to victory or defeat, as the case may be. When
each side can curtail its use of destructive tactics against the other side, can
benefit from the other side doing the same, and does not, in doing so, confer a
military advantage to the other side, then self-enforcing limitations on conduct
are possible.
But there is a difference between saying that the laws of war could apply to
states fighting terrorists and saying that the existing laws of war-those that
have evolved to deal with limited wars between roughly equal states-will apply.
The premise of acknowledging a body of laws of war is that the belligerents have
a reason to comply with them. However, one expects that the body of laws that
two ordinary states would respect would be different from the body of laws that
a state and a terrorist organization would respect in their violent dealings with
one another.
Indeed, one might argue that the dealings between governments and
different terrorist organizations are too heterogeneous to be covered by a single
code of law. We might prefer to isolate the bilateral relationships between
particular governments and particular terrorist organizations, identify the
conventions that evolved to regulate conflict between them, and leave it at that,
rather than refer to a broad code that governs the relationships between all
governments and all terrorist organizations but is frequently violated. This is
reasonable, but one could say the same thing about the relationships between
states that engage in limited war; these are surely just as heterogeneous. What
matters is not the label one uses but the substance of the laws, conventions, or
modi vivendi that arise-or that ought to arise-as states and terrorist
organizations struggle with each other.
23

See Michael von Tangen Page, Prisons, Peace and Terrorism: Penal Policy in the Reduction of Political
Violence in Northern Ireland, Italy and the Spanish Basque County, 1968-97 at 164-68 (St Martin's
1998).
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The question is, given that terrorism exists, what rules should govern the
military conflict between terrorists and governments?
The first point to recall is the constraint of symmetry. Any rule that
provides an advantage to government or terrorist will not be respected. The
outlawing of terrorist methods is the extreme example: governments can outlaw
terrorism but cannot expect terrorists to pay attention.
As another example, consider the prohibition on coercive interrogation of
POWs. This rule has not always been respected during regular wars, but it has
been respected at times. When each belligerent benefits more from the humane
treatment of its soldiers by the enemy than it loses from being deprived of the
fruits of interrogation, and-crucially--each party can monitor the other's
performance either through intermediaries like the Red Cross or through reports
from escaped or rescued POWs, then the rule is, in principle, self-enforcing.
And even if each state may cheat a little on the margins, it does seem that the
laws of war have improved the treatment of POWs during some wars. 24
But now we must ask ourselves whether the US could benefit from a
similar implicit deal with al Qaeda. The answer is probably not. Al Qaeda does
not currently hold American soldiers as prisoners, and if it ever does, it seems
highly unlikely that it would refrain from torturing and killing them, regardless of
how the US treats captured al Qaeda members. The problem is that, at the
present time, al Qaeda would gain less by sparing Americans, if it had any, than
the US would gain by sparing al Qaeda prisoners. The al Qaeda-US conflict is
not symmetrical in the way that an ordinary war is: the US cannot expect to gain
any benefits from al Qaeda by treating al Qaeda prisoners in a humane manner
given al Qaeda's demonstrated ferocity in its treatment of enemy civilians.
Thus, the symmetry condition is violated; it may be that the reciprocity
condition is violated as well. Suppose that both the US and al Qaeda believed
that both would be jointly, and equally, better off if they agreed (implicitly) to
treat prisoners humanely. The question now is whether each party can credibly
promise to comply with the deal as long as the other party does. We know that
the US could; but we do not know if al Qaeda could. It depends on whether the
al Qaeda leadership can exercise discipline over all those who see themselves as
carrying its banner. On one hand, some view al Qaeda as a relatively coherent
organization, and it may be that Osama bin Laden and other leaders can control
the activities of its members. If so, reciprocity is met; al Qaeda could engage in
self-restraint in return for American self-restraint. On the other hand, many
people think of Islamic terrorism as a more diffuse phenomenon, and it is
doubtful that any one person or organization controls the activities of members.

24

See Morrow, 55 Ind Org at 971 (cited in note 16).
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If so, reciprocity is not met. The practical problem is just that al Qaeda's leaders
would not be able to prevent members from treating prisoners inhumanely. If
so, then the US has no incentive to enter a deal with al Qaeda.
This discussion is only illustrative, but one clear implication is that the
"laws of war" between states and terrorist organizations are likely to be highly
context-specific.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most writing on the application of the laws of war to conflicts with
terrorist organizations is formalistic: the laws are taken for granted, and then
doctrinal analysis is used to determine whether various tactics against al Qaeda
are covered or not. My approach, by contrast, is to identify the underlying
purpose of the laws of war, and then see the extent to which they apply to
terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. I conclude that some terrorist
organizations are similar enough to states-they have enough power and
organization, and they have political goals that the target state may be willing to
accommodate-that it makes sense for a government and the terrorist
organization to try to limit the violence through the application of the laws of
war, even as they try to work out a political solution in the context of an ongoing
military conflict. It does not appear that the conflict between al Qaeda and the
US has reached this stage, though it may in the future.
In the meantime, I conclude that the US should not consider itself
governed by the laws of war in its conflict with al Qaeda, as they are normally
understood, but it should be alert for opportunities for creating implicit norms
of conduct that serve the American interest.25 If such opportunities arise, the
traditional laws of war may serve as a useful source for creating these norms.

25

It might be politically sensible to evade the laws of war through aggressive "interpretation" of its
provisions, rather than dedaring as a matter of policy that the US will not regard them as
conferring protections on members of terrorist organizations even if, under a proper
interpretation of the law, they do. Alternatively, the US might declare that such laws do not apply
to terrorist organizations unless those organizations commit to respect its substantive provisions
regarding the treatment of prisoners, civilians, etc.
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